Competitive Pressure: Competitive Dynamics as Reactions to Multiple Rivals

Competitive dynamics research has focused primarily on interactions between dyads of firms. Drawing on the awareness-motivation-capability framework and strategic group theory we extend this by proposing that firms’ actions are influenced by perceived competitive pressure resulting from actions by several rivals. We predict that firms’ action magnitude is influenced by the total number of rival actions accumulating in the market, and that this effect is moderated by strategic group membership. We test this using data on the German mobile telephony market and find them supported: the magnitude of firm’s actions is influenced by a buildup of actions by multiple rivals, and firms react more strongly to strategically similar rivals

Competitive Pressure: Competitive Dynamics as Reactions to Multiple Rivals

Competitive dynamics research has focused primarily on interactions between dyads of firms. Drawing on the awareness-motivation-capability framework and strategic group theory we extend this by proposing that firms’ actions are influenced by perceived competitive pressure resulting from actions by several rivals. We predict that firms’ action magnitude is influenced by the total number of rival actions accumulating in the market, and that this effect is moderated by strategic group membership. We test this using data on the German mobile telephony market and find them supported: the magnitude of firm’s actions is influenced by a buildup of actions by multiple rivals, and firms react more strongly to strategically similar rivals.Competitive rivalry; competitive dynamics; strategic groups; mobile telecommunications

The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance

We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents’ actions and maximize individually their Choquet expected utility. Our Choquet expected utility model allows for both an optimistic or pessimistic attitude towards uncertainty as well as ignorance to strategic dependencies. An optimist (resp. pessimist) overweights good (resp. bad) outcomes. A complete ignorant never reacts to opponents’ change of actions. With qualifications we show that optimistic (resp. pessimistic) complete ignorance is evolutionary stable / yields a strategic advantage in submodular (resp. supermodular) games with aggregate externalities. Moreover, this evolutionary stable preference leads to Walrasian behavior in those classes of games

Contracts and Promises - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements

In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on whether actions are strategic complements or substitutes. With strategic substitutes, there is a conflict between Pareto-efficiency and the incentives to abide. The opposite tends to be true when actions are strategic complements. The results are interpreted in the context of legal contracts and in that of informal mutual promises.partnerships; contracts; pre-play communication; legal enforcement; social norms; guilt

Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity

This paper explores the implications of fairness and reciprocity in dynamic market games. A reciprocal player responds to kind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The paper shows that for general perceptions of fairness, reciprocity facilitates collusion in dynamic market games. The paper also shows that this is a robust result. It holds when players' choices are strategic complements and strategic substitutes. It also holds under grim trigger punishments and optimal punishments.fairness; reciprocity; collusion; repeated games

"Hiding our faces to be seen": strategies of visibility of activism

Presentación en formato pósterThis paper explores how this gesture of masking, hiding, and facial-covering is not only a liberation response to a form of oppression or a political statement against some unlawful action; but that it also works as a strategy of visibility. Following the research of Eesley, DeCelles and Lenox (2015) focusing on activist types and tactics and Bennet (2003), about global activism and networked politics, we explore the strategic communication component behind the visibility in these protests. As Ciszek states “activism is a form of strategic communication” (2017, p.702). Combining a series of quantitative and qualitative techniques for its analysis, this paper brings together recent forms of “masked activism” around the world. We elaborate a typology that helps for the understanding of the strategies and actions happening in activism and social movements with the use of masks. The question deriving from this principle would be then, to what extent those actions and strategies are ideologically grounded: can these strategies and actions differ from movements to movements? And in particular, what does the mask do, in each case? Is a mask more than a mask? Exploring these aspects should enable further research on social movements and political activism from the strategic and communicative organisation.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech. Universidad de Málaga (España) - Sheffield Hallam University (Reino Unido

Public and Private Learning from Prices, Strategic Substitutability and Complementarity, and Equilibrium Multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust.rational expectations equilibrium, strategic complementarity, multiplicity of equilibria, asymmetric information, risk exposure, bedging, supply information

FY13 Planning Task Force Documents: University Library System, University of Pittsburgh, August 2011-June 2012

These documents provide a record of the work of the ULS FY13 Planning Task Force, which initiated and deployed a highly inclusive strategic planning process to analyze the library's strategic options, prioritize them, and identify key actions for implementation in FY13. The ULS FY13 Planning and Budget Report, submitted to the provost's office on 28 February 2012, incorporates the task force's recommended strategic priorities for FY13. Additional task force documents (e.g., meeting agendas, presentations by task force members, and materials related to the group's environmental scan) may be accessed via the library's internal site, Behind the Scenes, at http://bts.library.pitt.edu, under "General Planning.

Games of strategic complementarities: An application to bayesian games

Games of strategic complementarities are those in which any player increases his action in response to an increase in the level of actions of rivals. This paper provides an introduction to the theory of games of strategic complementarities, considers Bayesian games, and provides an application to global games.Strategic complementarities; games theory;